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Abstract 
Using a structural VAR framework and unique bank liquidity index, this study builds a short 
run model to analyse dynamic interactions among monetary policy, bank liquidity, and bank 
lending in India. We find that monetary policy shocks have strong initial and persistent 
impacts on bank lending, while liquidity shocks impact bank lending after a 9-month lag. We 
also find evidence of an indirect feedback channel between monetary policy and bank lending 
operating through changes in bank liquidity. However, the indirect effect of monetary policy 
on bank lending (through bank liquidity) operates with a lag of roughly 6 to 9 months.    
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1. Introduction 
The banking sector plays a pivotal role in the transmission of monetary policy. The literature 
commonly refers to the transmission channel of monetary policy that operates through banks 
as the ‘bank lending channel’. This bank-lending channel operates by affecting the supply of 
bank loans to the private sector. Since deposits and other sources of funding are imperfect 
substitutes, a rise in interest rate (or monetary contraction) constrains the liquidity of banks 
and forces banks to reduce lending to private sector. In turn, this decreases investment and 
consumption spending and, hence, overall economic activity (Igan et al., 2013). Therefore, 
banks with large liquid assets are better able to safeguard a fall in bank lending during 
periods of monetary contraction (Kashyap & Stein, 2000).
1
  
 
Besides the effect of monetary contraction on the liquidity of the banking sector, several 
other factors (particularly in emerging market economies) can affect bank liquidity and hence 
the lending behaviour of banks. As Khwaja & Mian (2008) point out, these factors relate to 
regime shifts, exchange rate volatility and speculative banks runs. Several studies in the 
literature examine the impact of a particular type of liquidity shock to the banking sector and 
the consequent pass through to borrowing firms. For example, Khwaja & Mian (2008) 
examine the impact of a shock to bank liquidity induced by the unexpected nuclear tests 
carried out by Pakistan in 1998. These nuclear tests led to a collapse in the dollar deposit 
                                                          
1
 The same phenomenon has been observed with other banks’ characteristics as well, for example, banks with 
high equity capital to asset ratio (Kishan & Opiela, 2000), banks affiliated to a holding company (Ashcraft, 
2006), and banks that can raise funds from international operations (Cetorelli & Goldberg, 2012). Another study 
by Khan et al. (2016) examined the role bank competition for the transmission of monetary policy through bank 
lending. Taking the sample of the five ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) countries, their study 
found that changes in the level of competition among banks influences the bank lending channel of monetary 
transmission.     
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market, as the Pakistan government restricted the withdrawal of dollar-denominated deposits 
accounts to local currency at an unfavourable exchange rate. This change in government 
policy disproportionately affected bank liquidity that relied heavily on dollar deposits. 
Khwaja & Mian (2008) find that a percentage point decline in bank liquidity led to 0.6% 
decline in bank lending.  
 
Schnabl (2012) examines the international transmission of negative liquidity shocks to 
international banks, and does so by taking the 1998 Russian debt default as a negative shock 
to liquidity of international banks and analysing its impact on bank lending in Peru. This 
study finds that, after the Russian default, lending by international banks to domestically 
owned Peruvian banks decreased by 61%. The author also finds that Peruvian banks 
transmitted this liquidity shock to Peruvian firms by reducing their lending. Similarly, 
Correa-Lopez et al. (2014) analyse the impact of liquidity shocks induced by the rising 
prospect of European sovereign defaults and changes in US money market regulations in 
2011. These changes generated negative liquidity shocks to European banks operating in the 
US through local branches that relied mainly on time deposits from the US money market as 
their source of liquidity. In turn, this shock to liquidity resulted in a reduction in branch 
lending by European banks to US borrowers. 
  
The above discussion highlights that in addition to monetary contraction leading to changes 
in bank liquidity and hence lending activities; other factors (national and international) can 
induce a liquidity shock to the banking sector and affect bank lending behaviour. Motivated 
by the different ways in which changes in both monetary policy and liquidity (because of 
monetary contraction or other factors) can affect bank lending and cause significant effects 
on economic activity, this study estimates separately the effects of monetary policy shocks 
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and liquidity shocks on bank lending within the same modelling framework. In particular, it 
analyses the effect of monetary contraction on bank lending (bank lending channel) and the 
effects of liquidity shocks (exogenous to monetary policy changes) on bank lending. Finally, 
by using a hypothetical scenario in its model, the study attempts to quantify the effect on 
bank lending due to a squeeze in liquidity following a monetary policy contraction.   
 
Before we can examine the effect of monetary policy shocks on bank liquidity and hence on 
bank lending behaviour, several other issues need to be tackled. In addition to their effects on 
the supply of credit, monetary policy changes can influence the ‘demand for credit’. The 
monetary policy channel that affects the demand for loans is called the ‘balance sheet 
channel’2 . The reason that monetary contraction worsens the balance sheet of firms is that 
reduced cash flows or a decline in equity prices leads to a fall in net worth of firms (Mishkin, 
1996). In addition, the higher cost of borrowing reduces demand for credit, hence reducing 
investment and aggregate economic activity. Thus, contractionary monetary policy works 
both ways by affecting the supply of credit as well as the demand of credit. Therefore, in 
order to analyse the effect on bank lending behaviour due to monetary policy shocks, the 
effect of these shocks on the demand for loans must be controlled for. There is ample 
literature on the monetary transmission mechanism that proves that loan demand conditional 
on banks’ characteristics is homogenous (Bluedorn et al., 2013; Ashcraft, 2006; Jayaratne & 
Morgan, 2000). Given homogenous demand for loans, any change in the lending response of 
banks due to monetary policy shocks can be attributed to a monetary transmission mechanism 
working through the supply of loans. Under the assumption of homogenous loan demand for 
banks with similar characteristics, the first major challenge is to extract the group of banks 
                                                          
2
 For more details on complementary explanations (from macroeconomic theory) on bank lending channel and 
credit or balance sheet channel, refer to Scharler (2008). 
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that share similar characteristics on one hand, and forms the sizeable portion of banking 
sector on the other.  
 
The other important challenge is to extract the monetary policy shocks that are exogenous to 
other relevant macroeconomic variables (mainly inflation and output as suggested by the 
Taylor rule (1993)) to which the central bank responds. These macroeconomic variables may 
also be determinants of bank lending along with changes in monetary policy. This raises the 
possibility that changes in bank lending behaviour due to monetary policy changes confound 
the effect of monetary policy and other lending drivers (Bluedorn et al., 2013). Therefore, 
without the proper extraction of monetary policy changes exogenous to these variables, their 
effect on bank lending behaviour that is solely due to changes in monetary policy cannot be 
ascertained
3
.     
  
Taking note of the above concerns, this paper empirically examines the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on the liquidity of the banking sector and the consequent pass through of these 
shocks to the loan supply. For this analysis, we take India as our case study for several 
reasons. India is a growing, emerging market economy and, more importantly, banks are an 
important source of credit in that country. Hence, bank lending plays a pivotal role in the 
transmission of monetary policy (Bhaumik et al., 2011). Further, commercial banks in India 
dominate the financial sector, comprising more than three fifths of financial system assets 
(Financial Stability Report of Reserve Bank of India (RBI hereafter), 2010). The group of 
commercial banks in India consists of public sector banks as well as private sector banks, 
                                                          
3
  The study by Kwapil & Scharler (2013) for the developed economies like UK and USA also suggested that 
the pass through of changes in monetary policy rates to lending rates of banks differs and this pass through 
depend on whether the monetary policy changes are expected or unexpected. 
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including foreign banks. However, all banks compete on a level playing field. These state 
owned or private banks are autonomous and driven by the underlying motive of profit. 
Commercial banks in India can be regarded as more or less homogenous with an underlying 
focus on profitability (Bhaumik et al., 2011).
4
 As noted above, commercial banks in India 
represent a sizeable portion of the financial (or banking) sector in India. Given this, we take 
these banks as representative of the banking sector for the Indian economy. 
 
To estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks on bank liquidity and lending, we need to 
identify exogenous changes in monetary policy (i.e. changes in monetary policy that are 
independent of the state of the economy). With endogenous changes in monetary policy (the 
changes in response to the economy), it is not possible to disentangle loan demand changes 
from loan supply changes, and the full effect of monetary policy on bank lending cannot be 
estimated (Bluedorn et al., 2013).
5
 To identify monetary policy shocks, we adopt a structural 
vector autoregression approach (SVAR), with contemporaneous restrictions and underlying 
assumptions on the central bank’s (the RBI in this case) feedback rule or reaction function, 
and structure of the economy. Our identification strategy is based on the scheme proposed by 
Mishra & Mishra (2012); as such, it is able to capture the monetary transmission mechanism 
for India without giving rise to empirical anomalies. We use this model to build a scenario by 
applying appropriate restrictions on contemporaneous causality to analyse and quantify the 
                                                          
4
 However, there might be differences in the customer base between the public sector banks and private sector 
banks (Bhaumik et al., 2011). 
5
 However, sluggishness in bank lending following monetary contraction may also come from factors such as 
loans under commitment (see, e.g. Bernanke & Blinder, 1992; Morgan, 1998; Kishan & Opiela, 2000), but a 
part of the sluggishness in bank lending behaviour is attributable to policy changes that are endogenous to other 
macroeconomic fundamentals (Bluedorn et al., 2013). 
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indirect pass through of monetary policy shocks to bank lending through changes in bank 
liquidity following these shocks. 
 
Our study makes several notable contributions to the literature. First, instead of using a single 
measure of bank liquidity, we construct a bank liquidity index using factor analysis.  
Theoretically, the composite measure of liquidity is better suited to indicate the overall state 
of liquidity in the banking sector as compared to individual variables (Gadanecz & Jayaram, 
2009). Second, our study builds a comprehensive short run VAR model to identify the 
exogenous changes in monetary policy, and uses these monetary shocks to analyse the effects 
of monetary policy on bank liquidity and lending within the same modelling framework. 
Third, our modelling strategy enables us to separate out the effects of liquidity shocks and 
monetary policy shocks on bank lending activities and underlying lags in the pass through of 
these effects. Fourth, by exploiting the contemporaneous causality structure, we attempt to 
provide evidence (for/against) on the indirect feedback channel between monetary policy and 
bank lending that operates through changes in liquidity.  
 
We do acknowledge some limitations of the present study, which provide scope for further 
research. First, in this study, we use the aggregate bank level data to analyse the effect of 
monetary policy on bank liquidity and lending but we do accept the possibility of cross 
sectional asymmetries existing in the loan responses of banks giving rise to asymmetric 
effects of monetary policy (Kishan & Opiela, 2006). We further accept the possibility that 
even at the aggregate level, the reaction of banks to monetary policy changes may be 
asymmetric, i.e., lending responses of banks to monetary policy can be different in easy and 
tight monetary policy regimes (Bhaumik et. al, 2011).  Second, we note that some studies in 
recent times emphasize the need to take into account changes in banks’ business model and 
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link between bank risk and monetary policy before analysing the bank-lending channel of 
monetary policy. As noted by Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez (2011), while analysing the 
bank-lending channel, bank risk should be considered along with other bank specific 
characteristics. This is mainly due to financial innovations, and variables capturing bank size, 
liquidity and capitalization (the standard indicators used in the bank lending channel 
literature) may not be adequate for the accurate assessment of banks’ ability and willingness 
to supply additional loans (Gambacorta &  Marques-Ibanez ,2011). Taking note of these 
limitations of the study, our main contribution lies in separating exogenous monetary changes 
and liquidity shocks and analysing separately the effects of these shocks on aggregate bank 
lending. The sample period for this study is December 1996 to December 2012.
6
 
  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides background 
information on commercial banking, monetary policy framework, choice of monetary policy 
instrument and the lending behaviour of the commercial banks in India; Section 3 presents a 
short note on empirical techniques as employed in this study; Section 4 describes the data and 
sets up the empirical model; Section 5 presents the main results; Section 6 discusses the 
results; and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Indian Context 
 
2.1 Commercial Banks in India 
The banking sector in India is divided into two broad groups, that is, commercial banks and 
co-operative banks, of which the former accounts for more than 90% of the country’s 
                                                          
6
 The reasons for choosing this sample period for Indian context are cited in section 4.  
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banking system’s assets (Financial Stability Report of the RBI, 2010).7 Commercial banks in 
India comprise nationalised banks (majority equity holding with the government), the State 
Bank of India (SBI) (majority equity holding with the RBI), the associate banks of SBI 
(majority equity holding with the SBI), Indian private banks and foreign banks.
8
 The public 
sector banks (PSBs) (nationalised banks, SBI and its associate bank) dominate the 
commercial banking space, comprising close to 72% of total commercial bank assets 
(Financial Stability Report of the RBI, 2010).  
 
In the pre-reform period before 1991, the banking sector in India catered for the needs of 
planned development in a mixed economy framework where the government was a dominant 
player in economic activity. The government used the banking sector as a captive source of 
funds by means of a statutory liquidity ratio (SLR).
9
 The SLR allocated a larger share of 
banks’ resources to government and the SLR requirement continued to increase, reaching a 
peak of 38.5% in 1989 to 1990. In 1992, banking sector reforms were initiated based on the 
recommendations of Narsimham Committee I. The main recommendations of the committee 
were to reinstate the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR)
10
 as an instrument of monetary policy (and 
                                                          
7
 It should be noted that commercial banks in India also include local area banks (LABs) and Regional Rural 
Banks (RRBs). However, all the banking statistics reported by RBI on commercial banking sector in India 
exclude LABs and RRBs.  Hence, all the information and statistics reported and used in this paper similarly 
exclude LABs and RRBs from the commercial banking sector. 
8
 Refer to Figure 2.1 (pp. 19 in Manual on Banking and Financial Statistics, 2007: the RBI Publication) for 
diagrammatic representation of the Indian banking structure.  
9
 At the close of business every day, all banks operating in India are required to maintain a minimum proportion 
of their Net Demand and Time Liabilities as liquid assets in the form of cash, gold and unencumbered approved 
securities. The ratio of liquid assets to demand and time liabilities is known as Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR). 
10
 CRR is the specified minimum fraction of the total deposits of commercial banks that these banks have to 
hold as cash or as deposits with the RBI, and is considered equivalent to holding cash with the RBI. Before 
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not as a means of controlling the secondary expansion of credit brought about by 
monetisation of the fiscal deficit), bring down the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR)
11
 in a 
phased manner, and phase out the direct credit program to the priority sector by the 
commercial banks.
12
 Further, the committee recommended deregulating interest rates and 
dismantling the policy of concessional interest rates on Government borrowing to bring it 
into line with the market determined rate of interest. The committee also proposed 
liberalising policies towards foreign banks with regard to opening offices, branches and 
subsidiaries. Consequently, reforms in the banking sector were carried out along these lines. 
The legislative framework governing PSBs was also amended in 1994 to enable banks to 
raise capital funds from the market by way of public issue of shares. The government 
initiated the legislative process to reduce the minimum Government ownership in 
nationalised banks from 51% to 33% without altering their public sector character. Steps 
were also taken to infuse competition into the financial system. The RBI issued guidelines in 
1993 with respect to the establishment of new banks in the private sector. Likewise, foreign 
banks were given more liberal entry and the norms for entry of new private banks were 
established (Mishra, 2013). In 1998, the second generation of banking sector reforms was 
initiated based on the recommendation of Narsimham Committee II. The main feature of 
second-generation banking reforms was the creation of asset reconstruction companies 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2006, the RBI could prescribe CRR for commercial banks between 3-20 per cent of their total demand and time 
liabilities. However, with the RBI Amendment Act (2006), RBI can now prescribe (keeping in view the 
monetary stability of the country) CRR for commercial banks without any floor and ceiling rate.  
11
 The present rate of SLR is 21.5 per cent (as at February 2015).  
12
 The priority sector broadly comprises agriculture, small-scale industries, small road and water transport 
operators (owing up to 10 vehicles), small business (original cost of equipment used for business not exceeding 
2 million Indian rupee), retail trade, professional and self-employed persons, state sponsored organisations for 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, education, housing, weaker sections and export oriented industries. 
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(ARC) to improve the quality of the balance sheet of the commercial banks. Hence, by 1996, 
commercial banks in India had become more or less independent in their operations 
(Bhaumik et al., 2011). 
 
 
2.2 Monetary Policy Framework in India and Selection of Monetary Policy 
Instrument 
At the beginning of the planning period in the 1950s, monetary policy in India was mainly 
determined by the government’s fiscal stance and was formulated against the backdrop of 
large fiscal deficits. In the second half of the 1980s, India adopted a ‘monetary targeting’ 
framework with annual growth in broad money as an intermediate target. After a balance of 
payments crisis in 1991, India adopted economic reforms that led to a distinct change in the 
early 1990s policy environment, framework and strategies.  Monetary policy then had to deal 
with traditional issues alongside new issues brought about by the changed economic policy 
environment. Indeed, deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets cast doubt on the 
appropriateness of exclusive reliance on money as the only intermediate target in the late 
1990s. The expansion of money supply emanating from monetisation of the government 
deficit and rising capital inflows rendered the control of monetary aggregates more difficult. 
The transition of economic policies from a controlled to a liberalised but regulated regime is 
reflected in the changes in monetary management in India. In 1998 to 1999, the monetary 
policy framework in India changed from a ‘pure monetary targeting strategy’ to a Multiple 
Indicator Approach (MPA). Although the basic objectives of monetary policy of ensuring 
price stability and availability of credit to productive sectors remained intact, the underlying 
operating procedures underwent significant change. Emphasis shifted from direct instruments 
of monetary policy (interest rate regulations, selective credit controls and cash reserve ratio 
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(CRR)) to indirect instruments (repo operations under liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) and 
open market operations (OMO)).   
 
The Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) was introduced in 2000 and enabled the RBI to 
manage liquidity on a daily basis by absorbing and injecting liquidity through repo and 
reverse repo operations on a variable interest rate basis. The LAF also helped to keep 
movements of the overnight call rate within a specified band, and provided monetary 
authorities with greater flexibility in determining both the quantum of adjustment and rates 
by responding to the needs of the system on a daily basis (Mishra & Mishra, 2012).  In the 
post LAF period, the repo rate emerged as the main instrument along with the lending rate of 
the RBI, thus replacing the bank rate for all practical purposes (Aleem, 2010). However, as 
Bhaumik et al. (2011) point out, CRR was not completely abandoned as an instrument of 
monetary policy and is still used in situations that demand a significant monetary policy 
response. 
 
In the light of the above discussion, it is difficult to select one indicator as an instrument of 
monetary policy for India. Several studies (e.g. Mishra & Mishra, 2012; Singh & Kalirajan, 
2007) suggest that in the post reform period interest rates emerged as the main instrument in 
signalling the monetary policy stance. Although the policy rates (namely, bank rate and repo 
rate) signal the monetary policy stance, expectations about monetary policy are formed 
through the overnight call money rate (CMR). The CMR is also the most closely watched 
variable in the day-to-day conduct of monetary operations and has emerged as an informal 
operating target since the operationalisation of the LAF system (Aleem, 2010). Many studies 
on monetary policy in India have applied the CMR as a proxy measure of monetary policy in 
India. For example, Virmani (2004) uses the CMR as a proxy measure of monetary policy to 
14 
 
estimate monetary rules; Kannan et al. (2007) use the CMR as a proxy measure of monetary 
policy to construct the monetary conditions index; Aleem (2010) uses CMR as a proxy 
measure of monetary policy to examine the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy; 
and Mishra & Mishra (2012) use the CMR as a proxy measure of monetary policy to model 
the reaction function of the RBI. The CMR becomes even more relevant in the present study 
given that the primary objective of our research is to analyse the dynamic interaction that 
occurs among monetary policy, liquidity and bank lending. The RBI mainly influences 
liquidity in the economy through intervention in the money market. Thus, for our research 
purposes, the CMR appears the most suitable indicator of the stance of monetary policy.
13
 
 
2.3 Lending Behaviour of Banks and Monetary Transmission in India 
Banks play a dominant role in financing economic activities and ill functioning banking 
sector has been a major source of financial crisis, including the most recent financial crisis of 
2007-2009 in both developed and emerging economies (Drakos & Kouretas, 2015). This is 
particularly true for India where, despite the recent upsurge in equity and debt financing, the 
share of banks in domestic corporate borrowing has remained high (Chapter 1V, Chart IV.1, 
pp. 44, Patel Committee Report
14
).  At the aggregate level, the two most important factors 
                                                          
13
 We also tried ‘yield of SGL transactions on treasury bills of 91 days (91 day Treasury bill rate)’ as a monetary 
policy instrument. The model with 91-day Treasury bill rate gave theoretically inconsistent responses of output 
and exchange rate to monetary policy shocks. This may be because in the period considered here, the monetary 
policy stance of the RBI was the provision of adequate liquidity to meet credit growth and support investment 
demand and to keep vigil on the prices and exchange rate.  The RBI mainly influences liquidity in the economy 
to achieve the mentioned objectives and to influence liquidity the RBI intervenes through the money market.  
 
14
 Patel Committee Report refers to Report of  the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary 
Policy Framework, submitted to the RBI  Jan21, 2014, available at   
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relating to lending activities of commercial banks are; lending rates and statutory pre-emption 
through SLR. These factors influence the credit disbursal by banks and influence the efficacy 
of monetary transmission. 
In July 2010, the RBI initiated a ‘base rate’ system to enhance transparency in lending rates 
of banks and thus enable a better assessment of the transmission of monetary policy. The 
‘base rate’ is the minimum rate at which a bank can lend. Banks determine their lending rates 
with reference to the ‘base rate’.  Though banks are free to decide their own base rate, they 
have to take into account certain factors like their cost of funds, adjustment cost for 
complying with CRR and SLR requirements, overhead costs and profit margins. Banks often 
use average cost of funds rather than marginal cost of funds to calculate their cost of funds. 
This is taken to be one of the potential reasons for the lack of responsiveness of their base 
rate to monetary policy changes (Das et al., 2015). SLR requirements suppress the cost of 
borrowing for the government and reduce the funds available with banks to lend to private 
borrowers. This constrains the transmission of interest rate changes through term structure.
15
 
As discussed above, the SLR prescription has gradually been reduced over the years as the 
part of banking reforms. However, it has been observed that banks have voluntarily invested 
in government securities above the statutory prescription (refer to table IV.3 , pp. 47 in  Patel 
Committee Report). The reason for this excess holding of SLR securities, as cited in the Patel 
Committee Report to the RBI,  is the fact that these securities serve as the only collateral to 
avail central bank resources under the LAF. This behaviour of  banks to invest more than the 
required proportion of their assets in risk free government securities reflects their ‘risk 
averse’ attitude and is known as ‘lazy banking’ in Indian policy circles. The main excuses 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/ECOMRF210114_F.pdf 
15
 For more discussion on impediments to monetary transmission in India, refer to ‘Chapter IV: Addressing 
Impediments to Monetary Policy’ in Patel Committee Report 
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given for this ‘lazy banking’ are the risk associated with credit disbursal in a developing 
country along with associated economic cycles, lack of expertise to screen potential 
borrowers and underdeveloped institutions to enforce contracts (Bhaumik & Piesse (2008)). 
Several other studies in the literature examine the bank lending responses to monetary policy 
changes using bank level data. For example, Bhaumik et al. (2011) analyse the impact of 
ownership on the reaction of banks to monetary policy. They found ownership to have a 
significant effect on banks’ response to monetary policy. Their findings also suggest 
monetary policy changes have different implications for less risky (short term) lending and 
relatively more risky (medium term) lending. Overall, their study found support of the view 
that monetary tightening by the central bank leads to a reduction in credit disbursal by Indian 
banks.  Another study by Nachane et.al (2006) demonstrated that whether monetary policy 
will be effective in influencing bank lending depends on various factors including credit 
quality of bank assets, the relative liquidity of banks’ balance sheet, and whether banks are 
constrained by risk based capital standards.  Going further down the segregation, Das et al. 
(2015) analyse the transmission of monetary policy at intra-bank level using branch-lending 
data. Their study finds evidence in support of cross-sectional differences in lending behaviour 
within banks in their response to monetary policy and these differences, in turn, can be 
explained by several branch level asset, liability and organizational variables. Given this 
background, in this study we will explore the effects of monetary policy shocks on banks’ 
aggregate lending through their effect on bank liquidity. 
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3. Empirical Strategy 
 
3.1 Construction of Liquidity Index 
We construct a liquidity index for Indian commercial banks using factor analysis. Factor 
analysis clusters the observable variables into homogeneous data sets and creates new 
variables (factors) from which an index can be constructed. This factor analysis is performed 
on four observable variables for which the monthly data is consistently available from 1990 
onwards. These variables are liquid assets to total assets, cash in hand to demand deposits, 
liquid assets to demand deposits, and liquid assets to total deposits. Demand deposits 
represent short-term liabilities of banks, while the sum of cash-in-hand and balances with 
RBI of commercial banks represent the ‘liquid assets’ of banks. These variables serve as very 
basic indicators as defined in the ‘core set’ of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) to gauge the liquidity of the banking sector.
16
 ‘Liquid 
assets’, as taken here, constitute a very restrictive measure of bank liquidity.17 Therefore, the 
liquidity index represents the prohibitive scenario for banks’ liquidity, and the results should 
be interpreted as the outcome in a least favourable scenario. We adopt four liquidity 
indicators in such a way that any increase in the ratio implies improved liquidity for the 
banking sector. The index takes values ranging from 0 to 100.  A higher liquidity index 
implies higher bank liquidity and vice versa. Detailed methodology of the construction of the 
liquidity index is provided in ‘Appendix: Methodology/Description’. 
 
                                                          
16
 Refer to Compilation Guide for Financial Soundness Indicators (IMF, 2006) 
17
 For a more broadly based definition of liquid assets, refer to Financial Stability Report (the RBI, 2014). 
However, given the monthly nature of exercise and long-time series requirement, we could find only the above 
stated variables to define ‘liquid assets’. 
18 
 
Figure 1 presents the final liquidity index and its constituent variables. Looking at the trends, 
it can be observed that liquidity index and its constituents’ recorded high values during the 
early to mid-nineties in line with the high CRR and SLR requirements.  On average, liquid 
assets to total assets, deposits and demand deposits (short term liabilities of the banks) were 
around 11%, 15% and 87%, respectively, from 1990 to 1995. Consequently, the constructed 
liquidity index also registered high values in the range of 70 to 80 during that period. 
Following banking sector reforms and phased reduction in CRR and SLR requirements, 
liquidity holdings by banks had gone down from 1996 onwards and more funds became 
available for lending and other investment purposes. This shift is reflected in the constructed 
liquidity index and its constituents. The ratio of liquid assets to total assets, deposits and 
demand deposits, on average, was around 8%, 10% and 65% during 1996 to 2000, and went 
down further to 5%, 7% and 45% during 2000 to 2007. Correspondingly, the liquidity index 
hovers in the range of 40 to 30 from 1996 to 2000, and 25 to 15 from 2000 to 2007.  
 
As the global financial landscape had undergone a major shift and faced a crisis of 
unprecedented extent in 2008, the stance of monetary policy shifted towards imparting 
greater stability to the financial system. The Reserve Bank of India pursued the policy of 
active demand management of liquidity through appropriate use of the CRR stipulations and 
OMO including the MSS and LAF. Consequently, the CRR had been raised several times 
from March 2007 to October 2008 (refer to chapter II, The RBI, Report on Trend and 
Progress of Banking in India (2007-08)), resulting in increased holdings of liquid assets by 
commercial banks. This shift is reflected in our ‘constructed liquidity index’ that increased 
and hovered in the range of 35 to 45, up from the earlier range of 15 to 25.   
 
19 
 
The year 2009 witnessed spill over effects of the financial crisis requiring swift and 
appropriate policy measures. Proportionately, the stance of monetary policy switched from 
tightening to easing from late 2008 and measures were taken to release liquidity holdings of 
commercial banks ensuing sufficient flow of credit to crisis affected sectors (refer to chapter 
III, The RBI, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India (2008-09)). Therefore, our 
‘constructed liquidity index’ declined from late 2008 to late 2009, and was in the range of 18 
to 20.  
 
In line with the global outlook towards improving liquidity risk management and exposure of 
the banking sector following the crisis (Box III.1, Chapter III, The RBI, Report on Trend and 
Progress of Banking in India (2009-10)), there was a renewed push on adequate liquidity 
holdings by banks. This shift is reflected in our ‘constructed liquidity index’, which increased 
to be in the range of 40 to 30 from 2010 onwards. 
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Figure 1:  
Constructed Liquidity Index (with its constituent variables) for Commercial Banks in 
India 
 
Notes: 
Liquidity Index and liquid assets to demand deposits are plotted on primary Y-axis while other constituent ratios 
are plotted on secondary Y axis. 
 
3.2 Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks and Vector (and Structural) 
Autoregression Techniques  
 
Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks 
 The monetary policy shock is identified as the disturbance term in an equation of the form: 
    (  )      
                                                                                              ( )                                                                                     
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Here    is the instrument of monetary policy and    is a linear function that relates    to the 
information set  .
18
 The random variable     
  is a monetary policy shock.
19
 We find that 
extracted shocks signal well the monetary policy stance of the RBI at various time intervals. 
 
 
Vector Autoregression (VAR)/ Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) Models  
A VAR is a convenient device to summarise first and second order moment properties of the 
data. The basic problem with the VAR is that a given set of second moments is consistent 
with many dynamic response functions. This shortcoming is overcome by defining the VAR 
in terms of mutually uncorrelated innovations and placing identification restrictions on the 
system of dynamic simultaneous equations. Sims (1980) popularised the method of using 
Cholesky decomposition of innovations or in other words, imposing a recursive structure for 
the corresponding dynamic structural equation model.  
 
An alternative to the recursive VAR or temporal ordering of variables is to allow for a more 
elaborate set of restrictions guided by economic theory. This is referred to as a structural 
VAR (SVAR)
20
. The SVAR approach integrates the need to identify the causal impulse 
                                                          
18
 The equation for monetary policy instrument, taken as reaction function of central bank in SVAR models, is 
‘reaction function in surprises’ (Clarida, 2001). This equation models unexpected discretionary monetary policy 
actions as a function of unexpected changes in output, inflation and exchange rate variables (in our model). 
19
 The estimated shocks using equation 1 are plotted in appendix figure A1 and related discussion is provided in 
‘Appendix: Methodology/Description’, section ‘Note on estimated Monetary Policy Shocks’ for interested 
readers. 
20
 Details on econometric aspects of VAR/SVAR modelling along with related equations are provided in 
‘Vector Autoregression (VAR) / Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) Models’ section  in 
Appendix:Methodology/Descrioption’. 
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response functions into the model specification and estimation process. Sufficient 
identification restrictions can be obtained by placing either short run or long run restrictions 
on the model. In this exercise we make use of the structural vector autoregression with short 
run restrictions.
21
 
 
4. Data and Empirical Models 
The model used here consists of eight variables, which are chosen to extract the monetary 
policy shocks and analyse the consequent effect of these shocks on bank liquidity and bank 
lending.
22
 The eight variables of the model consist of two foreign variables and six domestic 
variables. These form two blocks in the model; one is the foreign block with two variables, 
and the other is the domestic block with six variables. The two foreign variables are the world 
commodity price index and federal funds rate. World commodity prices represent global 
inflation and, with growing linkage of the domestic economy to the world economy (Mishra, 
2013), it has become an important variable in RBI’s information set to consider when setting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
21
 We place short run restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks and do not go into the long run restrictions 
structure, which provides for an interesting avenue to explore in future. As we limit ourselves to short run (that 
is, the period up to two year), we do not consider issues related to cointegration, which refers to the existence of 
long run equilibrium. Besides the short run focus of our model, the necessary precondition of all the time series 
being non-stationary for VECM modelling is not met. Therefore, we proceed with SVAR modelling framework 
where restrictions on short run parameters are derived from the structure of Indian economy and assumptions on 
reaction function of the central bank. 
 
22
 The structure of the model to extract monetary policy shocks is based on identification strategy applied in 
Mishra & Mishra (2012).  
23 
 
monetary policy.
23
 Federal funds rate is taken as a proxy for international interest rates, 
mainly because the monetary policy of Federal Reserve Bank acts as an external constraint on 
the monetary policy of the RBI (Aleem, 2010). Therefore, these two variables enter in the 
information set of RBI in our framework (refer to equation 1) before it sets monetary policy. 
The six domestic variables are: inflation (measured as the rate of change in wholesale price 
index (WPI)); output gap (measured as the difference between (log of) gross domestic 
product (GDP) at factor cost and its (log of) Hodrick-Prescott trend);
24
 exchange rate (as 
measured by the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)); monetary policy instrument; bank 
liquidity index; and gross bank credit (or lending). Call money rate (CMR) is used as the 
instrument of monetary policy.
25
 The foreign block variables are exogenous to the system. It 
implies that domestic variables are not entering into the equations of foreign variables either 
contemporaneously or with a lag. This assumption is made due to the small size of the Indian 
economy relative to the world economy, which makes it unlikely that domestic variables can 
explain movements in foreign variables either contemporaneously or with a lag.  
 
The data for the domestic variables (except for GDP) is collected from the annual Handbook 
of Statistics on the Indian Economy (The RBI, 2013). The GDP data is sourced from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM). The commodity price index is the Commodity 
                                                          
23
 Instead of using oil prices inflation as used in Mishra & Mishra (2012), we use global commodity inflation as 
used in Aleem (2010) for a closely related research objective. Further, in our framework oil prices enter into the 
system through WPI inflation. 
24
 The GDP figures are available per quarter only. These quarterly GDP figures are converted into a monthly 
time series using a continuous time-dynamic interpolation method (Moosa & Burns, 2012). 
25
 We re-emphasise that CMR is not the instrument of monetary policy. Rather, it is only an indicator of 
monetary policy stance and the prevailing liquidity situation in the economy. At the most, it can act only as a 
proxy for the instrument of monetary policy.  
24 
 
Research Bureau (CRB) BLS commodity price index.
26
  Federal funds rate (a proxy for 
foreign interest rate) is the US federal funds target rate – middle rate.27 The data on these two 
foreign variables is collected from DataStream. The sample period covers December 1996 to 
December 2012.
28
 There are three compelling reason to commence the analysis from 1996. 
First, the macro-stabilisation program undertaken after the balance-of-payment crisis in 1991 
started to show its effect after 1995 (Mishra and Mishra, 2012). Second, commercial banks in 
India became autonomous in their operations roughly from 1996 onwards. Third, the 
quarterly GDP series for India is available only from the third quarter of 1996.  
 
We use the following contemporaneous restriction matrix  29  in the benchmark case to 
isolate the monetary policy shocks and analyse the impact of these shocks on bank liquidity 
and lending: 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 More information on this index is available at http://www.crbtrader.com/crbindex/spot_background.asp 
27
 The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve 
to other depository institutions overnight. The daily effective federal funds rate is a weighted average of rates on 
trades through NY brokers. Weekly figures are averages of 7 calendar days ending on Wednesday of the current 
week; monthly figures include each calendar day in the month. The Fed Funds Target Rate is the Federal 
Reserve's desired target rate for the Fed Funds Rate. 
28
 It has to be noted that we did subsample analysis also, with the sample starting from 2000 given that some 
significant changes took place in Indian monetary policy regime roughly around that time (refer to section 2.2). 
However, we did not notice any significant change in the results from the subsample commencing from 2000. 
Therefore, the results from the full sample are provided. 
29
 Refer to ‘Vector Autoregression (VAR) / Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) Models’ section  in 
Appendix:Methodology/Descrioption’ 
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Here, ‘com’ is the world commodity prices, ‘ffrate’ is the federal funds rate, ‘inf’ is WPI 
inflation, ‘er’ is exchange rate measured by NEER, ‘mp’ is the proxy measure for the 
monetary policy instrument (the call money rate), ‘liq’ is liquidity index of commercial banks, 
and ‘gbl’ is gross bank lending. The non-zero coefficients aij in the above structure indicates 
that variable ‘j’ affects variable ‘i’ instantaneously. International shocks can affect the 
domestic economy rapidly; thus, as the foreign block variables have an instant effect on all 
the variables in the domestic block, they are ordered first. The equation for ‘mp’ is the 
monetary policy instrument equation, as defined by equation 1. The monetary policy 
instrument equation reflects that it is set after looking at current values of inflation, output 
gap and exchange rate. This assumption is valid for a developing economy such as India, 
where the central bank has multiple objectives.
30
 Ordering among the three policy variables 
(namely, output gap, inflation and exchange rate) is based on the results of pair-wise Granger 
causality tests.
31
  Following equation 1 and taking CMR as the instrument of monetary policy, 
shocks in this equation are classified as ‘monetary policy shocks’. These are exogenous 
shocks to monetary policy, independent of the state of the economy as characterised by three 
                                                          
30
 For more details on the validity of this assumption in Indian context refer to Mishra & Mishra (2012). 
31
 The results of Granger causality tests are provided in Appendix, Table A3. 
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key macroeconomic variables: inflation, output gap and exchange rate. Consequently, bank 
liquidity and gross bank lending are ordered after the monetary policy instrument to analyse 
the effect of these shocks on bank liquidity and lending.  
 
The benchmark case provides the building blocks for the alternative scenario. In this 
scenario, we do not allow monetary policy shocks to enter into the bank lending equation 
contemporaneously. This enables a quantification of the pass through of monetary policy 
shocks to bank lending through liquidity shocks. In order to build the above scenario, 
contemporaneous restriction matrix   is modified in the following way: 
 
Alternative Case: no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank lending 
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In this scenario, there is no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank 
lending, although monetary policy changes do affect bank liquidity. This enables a 
quantification of the indirect pass through of monetary policy shocks to bank lending through 
liquidity shocks, and comparison to the benchmark case where both monetary policy and 
liquidity shocks affect bank lending simultaneously. 
 
5. Results  
All series other than interest rates (federal funds rate and call money rate) are in natural 
logarithm with a base period of 1993-94. In each equation of the VAR model, a full set of 
27 
 
monthly dummies is included to address deterministic seasonality. We also include a dummy 
for the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (taking values of 1 from July 1997 to January 1998, and 
0 otherwise) and the global financial crisis (taking values of 1 from August 2007 to August 
2011, and 0 otherwise). The VAR models are estimated using Iterated Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (ISUR). The standard errors for impulse responses and forecast error variance 
decompositions are obtained by bootstrapping.  
 
The results of various unit root tests indicate that all variables other than output gap contain a 
unit root.
32
 Therefore, we use the first difference of the variables. The variables entering into 
the estimation are: commodity price inflation; change in the federal fund rate; domestic (or 
WPI) inflation; output gap; (appreciation/depreciation of the currency against the USD) 
exchange rate; change in CMR (as the proxy measure for monetary policy); liquidity growth; 
and growth of bank credit. The number of lags included in all the VAR models is six.
33
  
                                                          
32
 We performed Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF), Phillips Perron (PP), Kwiatkowski Peter Schmidt and Shin 
(KPSS), Elliott Rothenberg and Stock (ERS) point optimal test, and NG and Perron (Ng-Perron) modified unit 
root tests for the presence of unit roots in the series. If three or more tests suggested the presence of unit root in 
a series, we have taken the series to contain a unit root. These results are provided in Appendix, Table A2. 
33
 Several approaches are adopted to arrive at an optimal lag length of six. First, we adopt a ‘general to specific’ 
approach and, given the monthly frequency of data, we start with lag length of 12. The LM test for 
autocorrelation in the VAR residuals is performed at each lag length, and if residuals are found to be 
autocorrelated at that number of lags, the number of lags is increased (or decreased) to remove autocorrelation 
in the residuals. With this procedure, we arrive at the lag length of six. Further, we compute several lag length 
selection statistics, namely, Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz's 
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) and Hannan and Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC).  Out of these 
statistics, Final Prediction Error (FPE) statistics select lag length of six while others suggest lag length of one. 
We still use the lag length of six, based mainly on two reasons: first, due to no autocorrelation in residuals at six 
lag length; and second, at lag length of six, the responses of three key macroeconomic variables (output gap, 
28 
 
 
As a first step, we use the model to extract monetary policy shocks, and the residuals of the 
‘monetary policy instrument’ (or CMR) equation are the estimates of monetary policy shocks. 
We find that the impulse responses of the three key macroeconomic variables (output gap, 
inflation and exchange rate) to one standard deviation positive interest rate shock are in line 
with economic theory. There is an immediate fall in inflation and output gap and a rise in the 
exchange rate (or appreciation of the currency vis-à-vis the USD) following a positive 
interest rate shock. These responses to monetary policy shocks are in the direction suggested 
by theory, and thus can be considered a good approximation of reality (refer to Appendix 
figure A2). 
 
Once we isolate monetary policy shocks that are a good approximation of reality,
34
 we 
analyse the effect of these shocks on bank liquidity and lending under the benchmark case 
and alternative scenario, as discussed above. In order to analyse the different scenarios, we 
compute contemporaneous structural coefficients, structural forecast error variance 
decompositions (SFEVDs) and structural impulse response functions (SIRFs).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
inflation and exchange rate) to monetary policy shocks are in line with the broad predictions of most theoretical 
models. This is an important prerequisite for us to isolate monetary policy shocks using an identification 
structure that does not give rise to any empirical anomalies (see Mishra and Mishra, 2012) and can be used in 
subsequent simulation exercises. 
 
  
34
 Estimated monetary policy shocks are plotted in Appendix figure A1.  
29 
 
5.1 Contemporaneous Structural Coefficients 
Table 1 reports the structural contemporaneous coefficients (estimated matrix P from 
equation 2) for the benchmark case. The last row of Table 1 presents the structural 
contemporaneous coefficients in ‘gbl’ for the alternative case (estimated matrix P from 
equation 3). We report the structural coefficients only for ‘gbl’ equation in the alternative 
case, as only the ‘gbl’ equation changes from the benchmark case to alternative case.  We 
find that monetary policy shocks (as identified by CMR) have a significant contemporaneous 
negative impact on bank lending. This suggests bank lending is sensitive to monetary policy 
changes and the pass-through of monetary policy change to bank lending is almost 
instantaneous.  However, liquidity changes do not have an immediate effect on bank lending 
as suggested by the insignificant contemporaneous coefficient of ‘liquidity’ in bank lending 
equation. This does not change for the alternative case, where monetary policy shocks are 
restricted and do not have a contemporaneous effect on bank lending. We further notice that 
although monetary policy shocks have an effect on bank lending almost immediately, the 
same is not true for liquidity as the contemporaneous coefficient of ‘mp’ is insignificant in 
the ‘liquidity’ equation. The other notable result is the significant contemporaneous 
coefficients of global inflation (measured by international commodity price index) and 
international interest rate changes (measured by changes in federal fund rate) in monetary 
policy ‘mp’ equation. This supports our assumption that these two international variables act 
as a constraint on the setting of domestic monetary policy and enter into RBI’s information 
set before it sets the monetary policy instrument. 
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Table 1: Estimated Structural Contemporaneous Coefficients  
 com ffrate outputga
p 
inf er mp liq gbl 
com 32.629*** 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (1.69)        
ffrate -3.452 5.8*** 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (2.39) (0.30)       
outputgap 0.068 0.773* 72.898**
* 
0 0 0 0 0 
 (2.40) (0.43) (3.77)      
inf -7.986*** -0.119 -3.331 202.34*** 0 0 0 0 
 (2.43) (0.43) (5.33) (10.46)     
er -6.295** 0.649 -6.291 35.854** 62.36*** 0 0 0 
 (2.49) (0.44) (5.35) (14.91) (3.23)    
mp 5.508** -0.791* -17.4*** -24.364* -2.276 0.629*** 0 0 
 (2.53) (0.44) (5.43) (15.08) (4.56) (0.03)   
liq -2.117 0.298 -6.844 -5.757 -3.971 -0.055 4.034*** 0 
 (2.55) (0.44) (5.52) (15.14) (4.57) (0.05) (0.21)  
gbl 
(benchmark 
case) 
6.253** -0.277 5.205 -3.884 7.411* -0.256*** -0.231 102.4*** 
(2.57) (0.44) (5.53) (15.14) (4.59) (0.05) (0.30) (5.30) 
gbl 
(alternative 
case) 
7.929*** -0.563 -1.479 -12.547 6.142 0 -0.347 94.91*** 
(2.55) (0.44) (5.39) (15.05) (4.58) - 0.29) (4.91) 
Notes:  
(a) Figures in brackets are standard errors and ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
(b) com: International commodity price inflation (global inflation); ffrate: (change in) Federal funds rate; 
outputgap: Output gap; inf: WPI inflation; er: (change in) Nominal effective exchange rate; mp: monetary 
policy instrument (which is CMR: Call money rate here); liq: liquidity growth; gbl: Growth of bank  lending (or 
credit).   
(c) gbl (benchmark case): refer to equation 2. 
(d) gbl (alternative case): refer to equation 3. 
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5.2 Structural Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (SFEVDs) 
Table 2 reports the SFEVDs for benchmark case and alternative case of no contemporaneous 
feedback from monetary policy to bank lending. For the benchmark case, the results show 
that monetary policy shocks have a strong, immediate and persistent effect on bank lending. 
Monetary policy shocks explain roughly 12% variance in bank lending for the period 3 to 21 
months.
35
 In contrast, liquidity shocks have a weak and insignificant initial effect on bank 
lending. A similar result is noted earlier in terms of the insignificant coefficient of ‘liquidity’ 
in the bank lending equation in the contemporaneous restriction matrix. However, the 
SFEVD results suggest that although the initial effect of liquidity shocks on bank lending is 
weak and insignificant, it gradually builds over time. The significant effect of liquidity 
shocks in explaining the variance of bank lending comes roughly with a lag of 9 months. The 
shocks to liquidity explain around 3.7% variance of bank lending at 9 months, which slowly 
increases to approximately 4.3% at 21 months. 
 
The effect of monetary policy shocks on liquidity is rather small and comes with a lag. 
Monetary policy shocks have a significant effect on liquidity roughly at the 9 months lag and 
explain around 2.7% variance in liquidity of the banking sector. The effect of monetary 
policy shocks in explaining variance of liquidity marginally increases to 3% at the end of 21 
months. 
 
In an alternative case of no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank lending, 
the initial impact of monetary policy shocks on lending is weak (and insignificant) as 
                                                          
35
 We have reported SFEVDs for 21 months as beyond this period the SFEVDs become constant, suggesting 
that the effect of shock dies down somewhere between 21-24 months.  
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expected. We notice that, in this hypothetical scenario, the significant effect of monetary 
policy on bank lending comes with a lag of 9 months. However, the effect of monetary policy 
shocks on bank lending is much smaller compared to the benchmark case, and these shocks 
explain around 2% variance of bank lending between the periods of 9 to 21 months. The 
noticeable result is the increase in the effect of liquidity shocks in explaining the variance of 
bank lending in comparison to the benchmark case. However, the significant effect of 
liquidity shocks on bank lending still comes with a lag of roughly 9 months.  In this scenario, 
the shock to liquidity explains approximately 4% variance of bank lending at 9 months, 
which slowly increases to around 5% at 21 months. The effect of monetary policy shocks on 
liquidity is also stronger in this scenario as compared to the benchmark case. Monetary policy 
shocks explain roughly 4% variance of liquidity between 6 to 21 months, while these shocks 
explain roughly 3% variance of liquidity for the same period in the benchmark identification. 
These results indicate the existence of an indirect feedback channel from monetary policy to 
bank lending working through bank liquidity. 
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Table 2: Structural Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (SFEVDs) for Liquidity 
and Bank Lending 
Notes:  
(a) Figures in brackets are standard errors and ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
(b) Alternative case is where there is no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank lending (refer 
to equation 3 and for benchmark case refer to equation 2).  
(c) ‘mp’ refers to monetary policy instrument which is call money rate in our case; ‘gbl’ is growth of bank 
lending (or credit) and ‘liq’ is growth rate of liquidity index as constructed by the authors. 
 
Horizon  
SFEVD of liq as Explained by Shocks SFEVD of gbl as Explained by Shocks 
 mp  liq gbl mp liq gbl 
Benchmark Case 
3 
0.77 
(1.04) 
92.91*** 
(3.20) 
0.10 
(0.45) 
12.11*** 
(3.94) 
1.50 
(1.60) 
69.88*** 
(5.55) 
6 
2.52 
(2.04) 
82.04*** 
(5.27) 
3.41* 
(2.43) 
11.94*** 
(3.81) 
1.61 
(1.60) 
65.08*** 
(5.51) 
9 
2.69* 
(2.05) 
79.68*** 
(5.58) 
4.08* 
(2.75) 
11.67*** 
(3.88) 
3. 72* 
(2.65) 
64.22*** 
(5.79) 
12 
2.89* 
(2.13) 
78.47*** 
(5.82) 
4.52* 
(3.03) 
11.88*** 
(3.87) 
3.87* 
(2.62) 
62.97*** 
(5.88) 
15 
2.95* 
(2.14) 
78.00*** 
(5.90) 
4.80* 
(3.20) 
11.94*** 
(3.95) 
4.18* 
(2.88) 
62.75*** 
(6.02) 
18 
2.98* 
(2.14) 
77.80*** 
(5.94) 
4.89* 
(3.26) 
12.00*** 
(3.97) 
4.20* 
(2.88) 
62.53*** 
(6.05) 
 
21 
2.99* 
(2.14) 
77.68*** 
(5.97) 
4.97* 
(3.31) 
12.00*** 
(3.99) 
4.27* 
(2.94) 
62.46*** 
(6.09) 
Alternative Case 
3 
0.90 
(1.20) 
92.77*** 
(3.31) 
0.12 
(0.52) 
1.26 
(1.44) 
1.93 
(1.86) 
80.49*** 
(5.11) 
6 
4.28* 
(2.87) 
80.09*** 
(5.87) 
3.87* 
(2.71) 
1.69 
(1.53) 
2.00 
(1.83) 
75.12*** 
(5.30) 
9 
4.33* 
(2.83) 
77.81*** 
(6.08) 
4.64* 
(3.07) 
1.70* 
(1.33) 
4.31* 
(2.92) 
73.86*** 
(5.62) 
12 
4.40* 
(2.87) 
76.68*** 
(6.31) 
5.14* 
(3.38) 
2.01* 
(1.43) 
4.45* 
(2.87) 
72.51*** 
(5.79) 
15 
4.37* 
(2.85) 
76.26*** 
(6.37) 
5.46* 
(3.57) 
1.96* 
(1.39) 
4.80* 
(3.15) 
72.34*** 
(5.93) 
18 
4.38* 
(2.85) 
76.07*** 
(6.41) 
5.56* 
(3.64) 
2.01* 
(1.42) 
4.81* 
(3.14) 
72.11*** 
(5.97) 
 
21 
4.37* 
(2.84) 
75.96*** 
(6.44) 
5.66* 
(3.70) 
2.00* 
(1.40) 
4.89* 
(3.21) 
72.05*** 
(6.01) 
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6. Discussion of Results 
The results of this paper are analysed through focussing on the following main themes: 
 Analysing the impact and lag structure of monetary policy shocks and liquidity shocks 
on bank lending; 
 Identifying the influence of other factors (namely, global inflation and interest rates, 
domestic output gap, inflation and exchange rate) on bank liquidity and lending 
behaviour; 
 Examining the effect of monetary policy shocks on bank liquidity, and comparing the 
benchmark case with the alternative case (of no contemporaneous feedback from 
monetary policy to bank lending) for evidence of an indirect feedback channel of 
monetary policy to bank lending through bank liquidity. 
 
As noted, the effect of monetary policy shocks on bank lending is immediate and strong. 
These shocks explain around 12% variance of bank lending for the period of 3 to 21 months, 
while liquidity shocks explain around 4% variance of bank lending. Further, liquidity shocks 
operate with a lag, and their significant effect on bank lending comes with a lag of roughly 9 
months.   
 
Table 3 below reports the SFEVDs from the full model for bank lending and liquidity
36
. The 
Other factors that influence bank lending includes global variables, those being the global 
inflation rate (as measured by growth rate of international commodity prices) and federal 
                                                          
36
 The SFEVDs for all variables in the model are provided in Appendix Table A4. This table also contains a row 
‘consistent with theory’, which suggest whether reported variance decompositions are in accordance with 
theory, or not. 
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funds rate (as a proxy measure for the foreign interest rate). Together, these global variables 
explain roughly 11% variance in bank lending in a 6 to 18 month period. The susceptibility of 
bank lending to global factors is somewhat surprising as global exposure of Indian banks is 
rather limited. This sensitivity of bank lending to global variables can be attributed to an 
underlying fact, that is, the rising integration of the Indian economy with the global economy 
in the post reform period. The Financial Stability Report, the RBI (2010) noted that the rising 
integration of the domestic economy with the global economy creates a feedback loop 
between external shocks and domestic vulnerabilities, and the impact of external factors find 
its way into the financial sector from the real sector affected by these external shocks.  
 
Gokarn & Singh (2011) discuss the four channels that seem in operation through which 
global shocks are transmitted to the domestic economy. These channels are the trade, 
financial, commodity price and expectations channel. Empirically, they found that financial 
channels are becoming dominant in transmitting global shocks with rising capital account 
openness and capital flows. From a financial stability point of view, the uneven capital flows 
can put pressure on domestic asset prices and can cause huge capital losses to those entities 
which have exposure to such assets. This, in turn, can cause financial instability. The 
unfavourable effects of such volatile capital flows in India have so far been minimized 
through prudential sectoral exposure limits on bank lending risk weights and provisioning 
norms (for more details, refer to Gokarn & Singh (2011)).  
 
The other factor that affects bank lending significantly is domestic inflation. Shocks in 
domestic inflation explain between 4 and 6% variance in bank lending over 3 to 18 months. 
Domestic inflation is an important variable for bank lending decisions as well as for private 
borrowing decisions, because it changes the real value of lending (or borrowing). Therefore, 
36 
 
any unanticipated shock to inflation will either benefit the borrower if inflation is more than 
anticipated, or the lender if inflation is less than anticipated, and hence will affect bank 
lending.  
 
Some of the recent studies in the literature found rising susceptibility of domestic inflation to 
external shocks as the Indian economy is becoming more globalized (for example Mishra & 
Mishra (2012), Gokarn & Singh (2011)). Gokarn & Singh (2011) suggest that the pass 
through of external shocks to domestic prices can occur mainly through ‘commodity prices’ 
and ‘exchange rate channels’. Mishra & Mishra (2012) found that much of the volatility in 
domestic inflation can be explained through international commodity shocks
37
 and exchange 
rate shocks with these shocks explaining 11% and 13% volatility in domestic inflation, 
respectively. As noted earlier, with the rising susceptibility of bank lending to global factors, 
it seems that some of it finding its way into bank lending through domestic inflation. 
 
Another macroeconomic variable that significantly affects both lending and liquidity of the 
banking sector is the exchange rate. As noted in Table 3, exchange rate shocks explain 
around 5% and 3% variance of bank liquidity and lending for the period 3 to 18 months, 
respectively. There are various channels through which the exchange rate can affect the 
balance sheet and hence lending by banks (Jonas, 2014). Notably, exchange rate fluctuations 
affect the lending activities of banks if exchange rate movements affect the cash flow of the 
borrowers, or banks themselves engage in cross-border lending denominated in foreign 
currency. The balance sheet exposure of commercial banks in India to foreign borrowing and 
lending is limited and has actually declined over the years. For example, the proportion of 
foreign liabilities to total liabilities for Indian commercial banks declined from 8% in 1999 to 
                                                          
37
 Mishra & Mishra (2012) used crude oil prices as their measure of international commodity prices. 
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2000 to 3% in 2012 to 2013.
38
 The significant effect of exchange rate shocks in explaining 
variance in bank lending seems to occur from a rising linkage between the Indian economy 
and the global economy and, consequently, the availability of alternative funding sources for 
the corporate sector in the form of external commercial borrowings (ECB). As noted in the 
Financial Stability Report (RBI, 2010), this exposure of corporates, if unhedged, can expose 
them to foreign exchange risk and have an adverse impact on their domestic borrowings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 These figures are based on the authors’ calculation on the data sourced from Handbook of Statistics on the 
Indian economy (The RBI, 2013). 
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Table 3: Structural Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (SFEVDs) for Liquidity 
and Bank Lending from Full Model 
Notes:  
(a) Figures in brackets are standard errors and ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
(b) com: International commodity price inflation (global inflation); ffrate: (Change  in) Federal funds rate; 
outputgap: Output gap; inf: WPI inflation; neer: (Change  in) Nominal effective exchange rate; mp: monetary 
policy instrument (which is  CMR: Call money rate here); liq: liquidity growth; gbl: Growth of bank  lending 
(or credit). 
 
 
 
 Horizon com ffrate outputgap inf er mp liq gbl 
Forecast error 
variance of 
‘liq’ as 
explained by 
shocks  
3 
0.29 
(0.71) 
1.88 
(2.03) 
1.07 
(1.32) 
0.33 
(0.90) 
2.64** 
(1.56) 
0.77 
(1.04) 
92.91*** 
(3.20) 
0.10 
(0.45) 
6 
1.53 
(1.80) 
3.74 
(3.01) 
1.68 
(1.61) 
1.35 
(1.64) 
3.75* 
(2.34) 
2.52 
(2.04) 
82.04*** 
(5.27) 
3.41* 
(2.43) 
9 
1.55 
(1.70) 
3.61 
(2.96) 
1.72 
(1.60) 
1.44 
(1.57) 
5.23** 
(3.10) 
2.69* 
(2.05) 
79.68*** 
(5.58) 
4.08* 
(2.75) 
12 
1.80 
(1.73) 
3.74* 
(2.96) 
1.94 
(1.71) 
1.49 
(1.55) 
5.17** 
(3.03) 
2.89* 
(2.13) 
78.47*** 
(5.82) 
4.52* 
(3.03) 
15 
1.80 
(1.72) 
3.72* 
(2.94) 
1.94 
(1.70) 
1.53 
(1.55) 
5.26** 
(3.08) 
2.95* 
(2.14) 
78.00*** 
(5.90) 
4.80* 
(3.20) 
18 
1.82 
(1.73) 
3.73* 
(2.92) 
1.97 
(1.72) 
1.55 
(1.55) 
5.25** 
(3.07) 
2.98* 
(2.14) 
77.80*** 
(5.94) 
4.89* 
(3.26) 
Forecast error 
variance of 
‘gbl’ as 
explained by 
shocks 
3 
6.83** 
(3.55) 
2.66 
(2.25) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
4.20* 
(2.71) 
2.76 
(2.20) 
12.11*** 
(3.94) 
1.50 
(1.60) 
69.88*** 
(5.55) 
6 
8.12*** 
(3.71) 
3.31* 
(2.33) 
1.32 
(1.36) 
5.55** 
(2.92) 
3.08* 
(2.25) 
11.94*** 
(3.81) 
1.61 
(1.60) 
65.08*** 
(5.51) 
9 
7.32** 
(3.39) 
3.45* 
(2.23) 
1.11 
(1.14) 
5.23** 
(2.71) 
3.29* 
(2.31) 
11.67*** 
(3.88) 
3.72* 
(2.65) 
64.22*** 
(5.79) 
12 
7.55*** 
(3.38) 
3.53* 
(2.27) 
1.24 
(1.30) 
5.63** 
(2.87) 
3.33* 
(2.28) 
11.88*** 
(3.87) 
3.87* 
(2.62) 
62.97*** 
(5.88) 
15 
7.41*** 
(3.36) 
3.58* 
(2.27) 
1.22 
(1.25) 
5.54** 
(2.85) 
3.37* 
(2.32) 
11.94*** 
(3.95) 
4.18* 
(2.88) 
62.75*** 
(6.02) 
18 
7.45*** 
(3.37) 
3.56* 
(2.26) 
1.28 
(1.31) 
5.63** 
(2.90) 
3.37* 
(2.32) 
12.00*** 
(3.97) 
4.20* 
(2.88) 
62.53*** 
(6.05) 
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6.1  Indirect Feedback Channel From Monetary Policy to Bank Lending Through 
Liquidity 
In this section, we compare the two cases (benchmark and alternative case of no 
contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank lending), and attempt to ascertain 
and quantify the indirect pass through of monetary policy shocks to bank lending through 
changes in the liquidity. For this, we analyse the responsiveness of bank liquidity to monetary 
policy shocks and check whether this responsiveness increases in the alternative case. Then, 
we evaluate the responsiveness of bank lending to liquidity shocks in both cases. If, in the 
alternative case, liquidity is found to be more responsive to monetary policy shocks and bank 
lending is then found to be more responsive to liquidity shocks, this implies (keeping 
everything else constant) a greater effect of liquidity shocks on bank lending via increased 
sensitivity of liquidity to monetary policy shocks. This provides evidence in favour of the 
existence of indirect feedback channel from monetary policy to bank lending through 
liquidity. 
 
In Figure 2, we compare the structural impulse response function (SIRFs) for the two cases. 
The decreased responsiveness of bank lending to monetary policy shocks arises in the 
alternative case. This is by construction, as we do not allow the monetary policy shocks to 
have a contemporaneous effect on bank lending. Noticeably, we find that liquidity of the 
banking sector is more responsive to monetary policy shocks and, in turn, that there is a 
marginal increase in the responsiveness of bank lending to negative liquidity shocks in the 
alternative case. The increased responsiveness of bank lending to negative liquidity shocks is 
most visible when there is a drop in bank lending following a negative liquidity shock at 
40 
 
around 8 to 9 months in Figure 2. This drop is sharper for the alternative case as compared to 
the benchmark case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Structural Impulse Response Functions39  
Response 
of gbl to 
mp shock 
 
Response 
of liq to mp 
shock 
 
Response 
of gbl to liq 
shock 
 
Notes:  
(a) Alternative case is where there is no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank lending (refer 
to equation 3 in text and for benchmark case refer to equation 2).  
 
                                                          
39
 The confidence bands are not shown in this figure to show the differences in impulse responses between 
two scenarios clearly. The Figures with confidence bands for both the scenarios separately are provided in 
Appendix figures A3 and A4.   
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The picture becomes clearer when we compare the SFEVDs in the two cases. In Table 4, we 
calculate the difference in SFEVDs of monetary policy shocks to liquidity and liquidity 
shocks to bank lending in the two cases. We find that in the alternative case of no feedback 
from monetary policy to bank lending, shocks to monetary policy explain around 1 to 2% 
more variance in bank liquidity, and that liquidity shocks explain 0.4 to 0.6% more variance 
of bank lending for the period 3 to 21 months. These results indicate the presence of indirect 
feedback of monetary policy to bank lending through liquidity for Indian commercial banks. 
For any change in liquidity due to monetary policy shocks, around 33% (0.5/0.6 as a% of 
1.5/1.6) of it will transfer to the lending activities.  
Table 4: Testing of Differences in SFEVDs in Alternative and Benchmark Case 
Notes: 
 (a) Figures in brackets are standard errors and ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
(b) Alternative case is where there is no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank lending (refer 
to equation 3 and for benchmark case refer to equation 2).  
(c) ‘mp’ refers to monetary policy instrument which is call money rate in our case; ‘gbl’ is growth of bank 
lending (or credit) and ‘liq’ is growth rate of liquidity index as constructed by the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SFEVD of liq as Explained by Shocks to mp        SFEVD of gbl as Explained by Shocks to liq 
Horizon (alternative case -benchmark case) (alternative case -benchmark case) 
3 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.43** 
(0.18) 
6 
1.77*** 
(0.25) 
0.40** 
(0.18) 
9 
1.64*** 
(0.25) 
0.59** 
(0.28) 
12 
1.51*** 
(0.26) 
0.58** 
(0.28) 
15 
1.42*** 
(0.26) 
0.62** 
(0.31) 
18 
1.40*** 
(0.26) 
0.62** 
(0.31) 
21 
1.38*** 
(0.26) 
0.62** 
(0.31) 
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7.  Conclusions 
In this study, we build a liquidity index for commercial banks in India using factor analysis. 
Using this index in a structural VAR framework, we build a short run model of monetary 
policy for India. The identification scheme used in this study to extract monetary policy 
shocks produces these shocks without any empirical anomalies. Therefore, the model is 
considered a good approximation of reality to conduct experiments to evaluate the interaction 
among three variables of interest: monetary policy, liquidity, and lending behaviour of the 
banking sector. 
   
We find that monetary policy shocks have strong initial and persistent impacts on bank 
lending, while the significant effect of liquidity shocks on bank lending comes with a lag of 
roughly 9 months. We also find evidence in favour of an indirect feedback channel between 
monetary policy and bank lending that operates through changes in bank liquidity. We find 
that the pass through of liquidity changes (due to monetary policy shocks) to bank lending is 
roughly 33%, implying that around 33% of a liquidity change that follows a monetary policy 
shock is passed on to bank lending activities.  However, this indirect effect of monetary 
policy on bank lending (through liquidity) operates with a lag of roughly 6 to 9 months.    
 
The proposed methodology to examine indirect feedback channel between monetary policy 
shocks and bank lending operating through liquidity changes has wider applicability. By 
suitably modifying the VAR contemporaneous restriction matrix based on the structure of 
other economies and reaction functions of their central banks, the suggested approach can be 
used to analyse the pass through of liquidity changes due to monetary policy shock to bank 
lending in other economies.  
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Appendix: Methodology/Description 
 
1. Methodology of Construction of Liquidity Index 
We perform factor analysis on the observable variables, namely, liquid assets to total assets, 
cash in hand to demand deposits, liquid assets to demand deposits, and liquid assets to total 
deposits, using principal component factoring. Principal component factoring is a method of 
factor extraction where linear combinations of the observable variables are formed. This 
allows us to extract and select the initial factors. The number of factors is equivalent to the 
number of latent variables, and each factor is a weighted combination of the input variables. 
We use two objective criteria to decide on the number of factors to be retained. First, we use 
Kaiser criteria, which retain factors with reported eigenvalues that are greater than one. The 
eigenvalue is the total variance explained by each factor. Factors with eigenvalues of less 
than one are disregarded because they do not have enough total variance explained to 
represent unique factors. Second, we retain factors with a cumulative variance greater than 95 
per cent (Hair et al., 1995; Williams et al., 2012). Cumulative variance is simply the amount 
of variance explained by that number of factors (Refer to Table A1). 
 
To more clearly identify the relevance of each variable to each factor, the factor loads are 
rotated using orthogonal varimax methodology. The purpose of rotation is to simplify the 
structure of the analysis. Orthogonal varimax methodology is used for two reasons. First, 
varimax is the most common methodology for rotating the factor matrix because it minimises 
the number of variables that have high loadings on each factor. Varimax does this by 
45 
 
maximising the squared loading variance summed across the factors.
40
 Second, the 
orthogonal methodology is most suitable where there is more than one factor and factors are 
independent.
41
 Using the aforementioned strategy, we identify two factors to be retained. 
These two factors together explain more than 99 per cent variance of the data. Once the 
number of factors is identified, the predicted factor scores (i.e. the factor scores for each 
observation) are estimated using regression analysis.
42
 The predicted factors are weighted 
according to the percentage of cumulative variance explained by each of the two factors, and 
a non-standardised liquidity index (NSLI) is calculated for each observation by applying the 
methodology proposed by Krishan (2010) in the following way: 
       
    
        
                                                         (A1) 
Where     is the weight of factor i, and   
  is the factor score of factor i at time t, and i is the 
total number of factors, which in our case is 2.
43
  
 
From the non-standardised liquidity index (NSLI), a standardised liquidity index (SLI)
44
 is 
calculated as: 
     
             
               
                                                    (A2) 
                                                          
40
 This is preferred to the quartimax approach, which maximises the squared loading variance across factors 
(that is, summed over the variables).  
41
 Another benefit of using orthogonal methodology is that the loadings represent the correlations. 
42
 STATA was used to carry out this procedure. To compute the factor scores for each given observation, 
STATA multiplies the standardised score on each factor by the corresponding factor loading.   
43
 The weights are calculated as 
                                   
                       (               )⁄  
44
 Standardisation of the index eliminates positive and negative values, and makes the index easier to interpret. 
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2. Note on Estimated Monetary Policy Shocks 
The graph below (Figure A1) shows that the period of late 1997 was characterized by the 
loose monetary policy (or expansionary monetary policy) and this is what we observed 
historically also that the period of late 1996 to late 1997 was characterized by excess liquidity 
in the economy mainly due to the reduction in Cash Reserve Ratio 45 , Reserve bank’s 
intervention in the forex market in the form of dollar purchase, upsurge in bank deposits and 
sluggish growth in non-food credit.  
 
However, due to the continuing volatility in the foreign exchange market in the wake of 
South- East Asian Crisis, the Reserve Bank undertook a series of policy measures in early 
1998 to control liquidity and ease the pressure on the foreign exchange market. As a result, 
fortnightly average call money rate reached a historical high of 50% in the fortnight ended at 
January 30, 1998. This historical fact is supported by the estimated shocks from our model 
where we see a spike exactly in the same month. 
 
In period from 1999 to 2000, Indian economy faced challenges on several fronts. On the one 
hand, there was acceleration in global output and trade due to the continuing strength of the 
U.S economy and sharp recovery of the Asian economy,  but on the other hand the gains 
from global economic recovery was eroded by more than doubling of oil prices due to 
production curbs by OPEC. For oil importing country like India, this oil price surge translated 
                                                          
45
 “Consistent with the medium term objectives and on a review of the monetary and credit situation, CRR to be 
maintained by Scheduled Commercial Banks (excluding Regional Rural Banks) was reduced by 2 percentage 
points from 12 % of their net demand and time liabilities to 10 % in 4 phases of 0.5% point each, effective from 
the fortnights beginning October 26, 1996, November 9, 1996, January 4, 1997 and January 18, 1997 
respectively. Each percentage point reduction of CRR increased the lendable resources of banks by about Rs. 
4,275 crore.” (Chapter V, pp. V-21, Report on Currency and Finance, the RBI (1996-97)). 
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into inflationary pressure and constriction of import purchasing power. Thus on one side the 
inflation was rising due to rise in international oil prices and on the other side ‘the lack of 
sufficient demand pull characterizing the phase of business cycle through which the domestic 
economy was transiting, restrained the impulses for accelerating growth’(Chapter 1, pp. I-
1,Report on Currency and Finance, the RBI (1999-2000)). During this period the monetary 
policy remained mainly tight due to inflation considerations and also the sporadic volatility of 
foreign exchange market. This is also indicated by estimated shocks. 
 
The period of 2002-03 to 2003-04 was characterized by ample liquidity in the economy due 
to sustained accretions of capital inflows, contraction in food credit and liquidity overhang 
(Chapter II, Report on Currency and Finance, the RBI (2003-04)). The monetary policy was 
mainly loose and this is reflected in the figure. 
 
From late 2004 to early 2006, Indian economy, on one hand, remained upbeat on GDP 
growth mainly because of pick-up in agriculture output. On the other side, high international 
crude oil prices put upward pressure on inflation. Indian economy continued to exhibit strong 
growth in 2006-07 as well along with elevated inflation level driven mainly by primary food 
articles and manufactured products. The Annual Policy Statement of the RBI recognized the 
danger of overheating because of the combination of high growth and inflation along with 
rising asset prices and tightening infrastructural bottlenecks and set the direction of monetary 
policy setting. In view of the underlying inflationary pressure, the RBI mainly pursued a tight 
monetary policy during late 2004 to early 2007. The RBI took several pre-emptive measures 
as increase in CRR and repo and reverse repo rate, to keep inflationary expectations well 
anchored (Chapter II, Report on Currency and Finance, the RBI (2005-06 & 2006-07)). This 
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tightening stance of monetary policy can also be observed in our estimated shocks for this 
period. 
 
The RBI switched to an expansionary monetary policy regime from late 2008 till early 2010 
because of the deepening effect of Global Financial crisis on Indian and receding inflationary 
pressures (Chapter V, Report on Currency and Finance, the RBI (2009-10))
46
. This switch in 
monetary policy stance is also reflected in our estimated shocks.  
 
3. Vector Autoregression (VAR) / Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) Models 
A VAR is a convenient device to summarise first and second order moment properties of the 
data. The basic problem with the VAR is that a given set of second moments is consistent 
with many such dynamic response functions. Solving this problem amounts to making 
explicit assumptions that justify focusing on a particular dynamic response function. A VAR 
for a k-dimensional vector of variables   , is given by: 
      (   )     (   )            (   )          
                    (  ) 
Here,   is a nonnegative integer and    is uncorrelated with all variables dated (t-1) and 
earlier. Knowing      , the    
    and   are insufficient to compute the dynamic response 
function of   to the fundamental economic shock in the economy. The basic reason is that t 
is the one step ahead forecast error in   . Each element of    reflects the effect of all the 
fundamental economic shocks. There is no reason to presume that any element of    
corresponds to a particular economic shock, for example, a monetary policy shock.  
 
                                                          
46
 For detailed analysis of real sector, price situation and related monetary measures refer to Annual series of 
Report on Currency and Finance, the RBI Publication.  
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This shortcoming is overcome by rewriting (4) in terms of mutually uncorrelated innovations. 
Suppose we have a matrix   such that      . If we had such a P, then           . This 
implies that   can be used to orthogonalise   . Choosing   is similar to placing identification 
restrictions on the system of dynamic simultaneous equations. Sims (1980) popularised the 
method of choosing   to be the Cholesky decomposition of   . The impulse response 
functions based on this choice of   are known as the orthogonalised impulse response 
functions. Choosing   to be the Cholesky decomposition of   is equivalent to imposing a 
recursive structure for the corresponding dynamic structural equation model.  
 
An alternative to the recursive VAR or temporal ordering of variables is to allow for a more 
elaborate set of restrictions guided by economic theory. This is referred to as a structural 
VAR (SVAR). The SVAR approach integrates the need to identify the causal impulse 
response functions into the model specification and estimation process. Sufficient 
identification restrictions can be obtained by placing either short run or long run restrictions 
on the model. In this exercise we make use of the structural vector autoregression with short 
run restrictions.
47
 The short run SVAR model can be written as: 
 (          
             
 )                                  (  ) 
Here,   is the lag operator     and               are     matrices of parameters,    
is a     vector of innovations with     (   ) and  (     
 )       for all      and     is 
a      vector of orthogonalised disturbances, that is,     (    )  and  (     
 )      for 
                                                          
47
 We place only short run restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks. We do not go into the long run 
restrictions structure. As we limit ourselves to short run (that is, the period up to two year), we do not consider 
issues related to cointegration, which refers to the existence of long run equilibrium.  
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all        These transformations of the innovations allow us to analyse the dynamics of the 
system in terms of a change to an element of   . 
The short run SVAR model chooses        (  and   are assumed to be nonsingular) to 
identify causal impulse response functions. P defines a transformation of   that identifies the 
structural impulse response functions. To see this point, note that the latter equality in 
equation (5) implies that: 
     
         
                                                                                   (  ) 
Taking the expectation of both sides yields: 
                                                                                                       (  ) 
Since,   contains   (   )    free parameters, we need   (   )   restrictions. In 
SVAR modelling,    identifies the structural impulse response functions and   itself is 
identified by the restrictions placed on the parameters in   and  . Since there are       total 
parameters in   and  , the order condition for identification requires that there must be at 
least      (   )    restrictions placed on those parameters. In VAR modelling,   is a 
lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal and    is diagonal matrix,   (obtained by 
plugging in estimates   and  ) and should be equal to Cholesky decomposition of   . 
However, in the structural VAR approach,   can be any structure as long as it has enough 
restrictions. 
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Appendix: Tables 
Table A1: Factor Analysis Results  
Factor Selection Statistics 
 Eigenvalue Cumulative variance Weights 
Factor1 2.92 0.73 0.73 
Factor2 1.04 0.99 0.27 
Factor Loadings* 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness  
Liquid assets to total 
assets 
0.996 - 0.005 
Cash in hand to demand 
deposits 
- 0.998 0.002 
Liquid assets to demand 
deposits 
0.957 - 0.021 
Liquid assets to total 
deposits 
0.996 - 0.008 
Predicted Factor Scores 
Variables Factor 1 Factor2  
Liquid assets to total 
assets 
0.35 -0.12 - 
Cash in hand to demand 
deposits 
-0.05 0.95  
Liquid assets to demand 
deposits 
0.32 0.18 - 
Liquid assets to total 
deposits 
0.35 -0.09 - 
Correlation between Factors and Standardised Liquidity Index 
Factor1 0.94 
0.34 Factor2 
Note: * Blank in factor loading column represents abs (loading) <0.3 
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Table A2: Results for unit root tests  
Variable ADF Test PP Test KPSS Test 
ERS Point 
Optimal 
Test 
Ng-Perron 
Modified 
Unit root 
Test 
com -0.57 -0.59 1.39*** 15.95 -0.86 
ffrate -1.66 -1.22 0.91*** 9.78 -2.79 
outputgap -4.84*** -4.09*** 0.01 42.55 0.30 
inf 0.84 1.20 1.69*** 808.06 2.01 
er -2.16** -1.88 0.12 2.90** -11.48** 
mp -7.21*** -7.58*** 0.33 0.46*** -56.93*** 
liq -3.12** -2.81* 0.43* 4.66 -6.36* 
gbl -0.57 0.49 1.71*** 2045.06 -13.08** 
After First Differencing 
com -10.37*** -10.46*** 0.15 0.28*** -87.82*** 
ffrate -4.14*** -11.75*** 0.07 1.02*** -23.81*** 
outputgap      
inf -9.37*** -9.36*** 0.22 0.54*** -59.21*** 
er -10.01*** -11.87*** 0.14 0.36*** -86.41*** 
mp      
liq -12.70*** -18.75*** 0.21 1.11*** -1.15 
gbl -2.74* -15.29*** 0.21 14.47 -0.67 
Notes:  
(a) For the ADF test the lag length was selected by using SIC (Modified SIC for ERS & Ng-Perron) values.  
(b.) For PP and KPSS test the optimal bandwidth was selected by Newey-West method using Bartlett kernel.  
(c) All the unit root tests were performed with the assumption of constant term in the logarithm of the series, 
with the null hypothesis of unit root for all tests except for KPSS test where null was stationarity. 
(d) The maximum lag length selected in all cases is 14 based on the formula lag lengthmax = int(12(T/100)
0.25
) 
suggested by Hayashi (2000, p.594). 
(e) The spectral estimation method for the ERS point optimal test and Ng-Perron modified unit root test is AR 
spectral OLS and AR GLS (detrended), respectively.  
(f) 
*
 , 
**
, 
***
 denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
53 
 
Table A3: Results of Pair-wise Granger Causality Test   
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
outputgap does  not Granger Cause inf 2.46 0.00 
inf does not Granger Cause outputgap 1.13 0.33 
inf does  not Granger Cause er 0.63 0.43 
er does not Granger Cause inf 1.85 0.18 
outputgap does  not Granger Cause er 2.04 0.01 
er does not Granger Cause outputgap 1.23 0.24 
Note: The lag length was selected by using the most common lag choice from alternative 5 criteria: LR, FPE, 
AIC, SIC and HQ test statistics.  
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Table A4: Structural Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (SFEVDs) for full model 
 Horizon com ffrate outputgap inf er mp liq gbl 
Forecast error variance 
of ‘outputgap’ as 
explained by shocks 
3 
1.02 
(1.66) 
5.25 
(4.15) 
88.87*** 
(4.83) 
0.35 
(0.69) 
0.21 
(0.55) 
2.67* 
(2.04) 
1.05 
(1.11) 
0.57 
(0.88) 
6 
3.35 
(3.23) 
7.93* 
(5.17) 
73.96*** 
(7.35) 
5.26 
(4.06) 
2.08 
(2.71) 
4.91* 
(2.99) 
2.05 
(1.80) 
0.47 
(0.65) 
9 
4.12 
(3.44) 
8.80* 
(5.37) 
71.89*** 
(7.84) 
5.03* 
(3.90) 
2.66 
(3.04) 
4.75* 
(3.08) 
2.02 
(1.77) 
0.74 
(0.85) 
12 
4.65* 
(3.46) 
9.86** 
(5.80) 
69.37*** 
(8.65) 
5.55* 
(4.27) 
3.16 
(3.49) 
4.57* 
(2.91) 
2.00 
(1.64) 
0.83 
(0.82) 
15 
4.62* 
(3.48) 
9.71** 
(5.74) 
69.28*** 
(8.75) 
5.58* 
(4.30) 
3.13 
(3.47) 
4.68* 
(2.95) 
2.14 
(1.73) 
0.84 
(0.81) 
18 
4.84* 
(3.57) 
9.70** 
(5.74) 
68.97*** 
(8.86) 
5.68* 
(4.38) 
3.17 
(3.51) 
4.66* 
(2.94) 
2.13 
(1.72) 
0.85 
(0.81) 
Consistent with theory  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Forecast error variance 
of ‘inf’ as explained by 
shocks 
3 
10.55** 
(4.76) 
1.66 
(2.02) 
1.78 
(1.62) 
82.47*** 
(5.59) 
2.09 
(2.02) 
0.44 
(0.83) 
0.27 
(0.70) 
0.73 
(1.02) 
6 
12.84*** 
(5.06) 
3.25 
(2.56) 
4.08** 
(2.31) 
67.28*** 
(5.92) 
5.91** 
(3.02) 
0.95 
(1.11) 
4.15** 
(2.37) 
1.55 
(0.43) 
9 
12.41*** 
(4.89) 
4.86** 
(2.69) 
5.88*** 
(2.46) 
63.10*** 
(5.82) 
6.44** 
(2.97) 
1.24 
(1.14) 
4.59** 
(2.50) 
1.49 
(1.38) 
12 
12.35*** 
(4.74) 
6.44** 
(3.23) 
5.74*** 
(2.39) 
61.35*** 
(5.91) 
6.53** 
(2.92) 
1.52* 
(1.15) 
4.50** 
(2.43) 
1.58 
(1.38) 
15 
12.34*** 
(4.71) 
6.78** 
(3.41) 
5.79*** 
(2.42) 
60.94*** 
(5.97) 
6.55** 
(2.90) 
1.53* 
(1.15) 
4.47** 
(2.42) 
1.59 
(1.37) 
18 
12.33*** 
(4.69) 
6.82** 
(3.45) 
5.87*** 
(2.46) 
60.78*** 
(5.99) 
6.53** 
(2.89) 
1.57* 
(1.15) 
4.47** 
(2.41) 
1.63 
(1.38) 
Consistent with theory  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Forecast error variance 
of ‘er’ as explained by 
shocks 
3 
3.24 
(2.79) 
2.13 
(2.10) 
0.74 
(1.07) 
3.40* 
(2.55) 
88.06*** 
(4.72) 
0.88 
(1.17) 
1.23 
(1.56) 
0.34 
(0.67) 
6 
4.46* 
(3.19) 
3.33* 
(2.45) 
1.39 
(1.25) 
3.73* 
(2.53) 
82.77*** 
(5.01) 
2.13 
(1.67) 
1.49 
(1.56) 
0.70 
(0.98) 
9 
4.60* 
(3.27) 
3.57* 
(2.58) 
1.56 
(1.42) 
3.78* 
(2.48) 
81.81*** 
(5.15) 
2.31* 
(1.77) 
1.60 
(1.48) 
0.77 
(1.03) 
12 
4.71* 
(3.25) 
3.69* 
(2.62) 
1.58 
(1.44) 
3.79* 
(2.47) 
81.40*** 
(5.21) 
2.38* 
(1.78) 
1.65 
(1.47) 
0.80 
(1.09) 
15 
4.75* 
(3.24) 
3.78* 
(2.63) 
1.61 
(1.45) 
3.80* 
(2.46) 
81.15*** 
(5.25) 
2.40* 
(1.78) 
1.66 
(1.46) 
0.86 
(1.11) 
18 
4.76* 
(3.24) 
3.79* 
(2.63) 
1.61 
(1.46) 
3.80* 
(2.46) 
81.08*** 
(5.26) 
2.42* 
(1.79) 
1.66 
(1.46) 
0.88 
(1.14) 
Consistent with theory  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Forecast error variance 
of ‘mp’ as explained by 
shocks 
3 
4.16* 
(2.94) 
1.00 
(1.08) 
4.62** 
(2.49) 
0.99 
(1.44) 
1.90 
(1.64) 
84.45*** 
(4.71) 
1.88 
(2.06) 
1.00 
(1.36) 
6 
4.13* 
(2.92) 
1.67 
(1.66) 
4.77** 
(2.47) 
1.94 
(2.03) 
2.63* 
(1.94) 
81.22*** 
(5.19) 
2.54 
(2.40) 
1.10 
(1.41) 
9 
4.39* 
(2.96) 
1.80 
(1.63) 
4.69** 
(2.43) 
1.92 
(2.00) 
2.73* 
(1.90) 
79.16*** 
(5.39) 
3.37 
(2.63) 
1.94 
(1.90) 
12 
4.50* 
(2.98) 
1.84 
(1.61) 
4.68** 
(2.42) 
1.93 
(2.00) 
2.79* 
(1.90) 
78.80*** 
(5.46) 
3.47* 
(2.64) 
1.99 
(1.90) 
15 
4.50* 
(2.98) 
1.89 
(1.60) 
4.68** 
(1.51) 
1.93 
(2.00) 
2.80* 
(1.88) 
78.58*** 
(5.50) 
3.53* 
(2.64) 
2.09 
(1.97) 
18 
4.51* 
(2.98) 
1.89 
(1.60) 
4.68** 
(2.42) 
1.93 
(2.00) 
2.81* 
(1.88) 
78.55*** 
(5.51) 
3.53* 
(2.64) 
2.10 
(1.97) 
Consistent with theory  Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Forecast error variance 
of ‘liq’ as explained by 
shocks  
3 
0.29 
(0.71) 
1.88 
(2.03) 
1.07 
(1.32) 
0.33 
(0.90) 
2.64** 
(1.56) 
0.77 
(1.04) 
92.91*** 
(3.20) 
0.10 
(0.45) 
6 1.53 3.74 1.68 1.35 3.75* 2.52 82.04*** 3.41* 
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Notes:  
 
a) The “consistent with theory” comments are based on the following decision rules. Any estimation 
result that is statistically significant and in accordance with macroeconomic theory is denoted “yes”. 
The reason is that macroeconomic theory posits that a relationship exists and the empirical results also 
support the existence of this relationship. In contrast, any estimation result that is statistically 
insignificant whereas macroeconomic theory suggests that a relationship exists is denoted “no”. The 
reason is that theoretically one would expect a relationship to exist, however the empirical results find 
no evidence of a relationship between the variables.  
b) Figures in brackets are standard errors and ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
c) com: International commodity price inflation (global inflation); ffrate: (Change  in) Federal funds rate; 
outputgap: Output gap; inf: WPI inflation; neer: (Change  in) Nominal effective exchange rate; mp: 
monetary policy instrument (which is  CMR: Call money rate here); liq: liquidity growth; gbl: Growth 
of bank  lending (or credit). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.80) (3.01) (1.61) (1.64) (2.34) (2.04) (5.27) (2.43) 
9 
1.55 
(1.70) 
3.61 
(2.96) 
1.72 
(1.60) 
1.44 
(1.57) 
5.23** 
(3.10) 
2.69* 
(2.05) 
79.68*** 
(5.58) 
4.08* 
(2.75) 
12 
1.80 
(1.73) 
3.74* 
(2.96) 
1.94 
(1.71) 
1.49 
(1.55) 
5.17** 
(3.03) 
2.89* 
(2.13) 
78.47*** 
(5.82) 
4.52* 
(3.03) 
15 
1.80 
(1.72) 
3.72* 
(2.94) 
1.94 
(1.70) 
1.53 
(1.55) 
5.26** 
(3.08) 
2.95* 
(2.14) 
78.00*** 
(5.90) 
4.80* 
(3.20) 
18 
1.82 
(1.73) 
3.73* 
(2.92) 
1.97 
(1.72) 
1.55 
(1.55) 
5.25** 
(3.07) 
2.98* 
(2.14) 
77.80*** 
(5.94) 
4.89* 
(3.26) 
Consistent with theory  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Forecast error variance 
of ‘gbl’ as explained by 
shocks 
3 
6.83** 
(3.55) 
2.66 
(2.25) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
4.20* 
(2.71) 
2.76 
(2.20) 
12.11*** 
(3.94) 
1.50 
(1.60) 
69.88*** 
(5.55) 
6 
8.12*** 
(3.71) 
3.31* 
(2.33) 
1.32 
(1.36) 
5.55** 
(2.92) 
3.08* 
(2.25) 
11.94*** 
(3.81) 
1.61 
(1.60) 
65.08*** 
(5.51) 
9 
7.32** 
(3.39) 
3.45* 
(2.23) 
1.11 
(1.14) 
5.23** 
(2.71) 
3.29* 
(2.31) 
11.67*** 
(3.88) 
3.72* 
(2.65) 
64.22*** 
(5.79) 
12 
7.55*** 
(3.38) 
3.53* 
(2.27) 
1.24 
(1.30) 
5.63** 
(2.87) 
3.33* 
(2.28) 
11.88*** 
(3.87) 
3.87* 
(2.62) 
62.97*** 
(5.88) 
15 
7.41*** 
(3.36) 
3.58* 
(2.27) 
1.22 
(1.25) 
5.54** 
(2.85) 
3.37* 
(2.32) 
11.94*** 
(3.95) 
4.18* 
(2.88) 
62.75*** 
(6.02) 
18 
7.45*** 
(3.37) 
3.56* 
(2.26) 
1.28 
(1.31) 
5.63** 
(2.90) 
3.37* 
(2.32) 
12.00*** 
(3.97) 
4.20* 
(2.88) 
62.53*** 
(6.05) 
Consistent with theory  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix: Figures 
 
Figure A1: Estimated Monetary Policy Shocks 
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Figure A2:  Identification of Monetary Policy Shock  
Impulse to 
mp, 
response of 
outputgap  
 
Impulse to 
mp, 
response of 
inf 
 
Impulse to 
mp, 
response of 
er 
 
Note: ‘mp’ refers to monetary policy instrument which is call money rate in our case; ‘outputgap’ is difference 
between (log of) gross domestic product (GDP) at factor cost and its (log of) Hodrick-Prescott trend); ‘inf’ is the 
inflation rate (measured by Wholesale Price Index (WPI);‘er’ is the (change in) Nominal effective exchange 
rate. 
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Figure A3: Structural Impulse Response Functions-Benchmark case 
Response 
of gbl to 
mp shock 
 
Response 
of liq to mp 
shock 
 
Response 
of gbl to liq 
shock 
 
Notes:  
(a) ‘mp’ refers to monetary policy instrument which is call money rate in our case; ‘gbl’ is growth of bank 
lending (or credit) and ‘liq’ is growth rate of liquidity index as constructed by the authors (refer to equation 2 in 
the text).  
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Figure A4: Structural Impulse Response Functions-Alternative case 
Response 
of gbl to 
mp shock 
 
Response 
of liq to 
mp shock 
 
Response 
of gbl to 
liq shock 
 
Notes:  
(a) Alternative case is where there is no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to bank lending (refer 
to equation 3 in text).  
(b) ‘mp’ refers to monetary policy instrument which is call money rate in our case; ‘gbl’ is growth of bank 
lending (or credit) and ‘liq’ is growth rate of liquidity index as constructed by the authors (refer to equation 3 in 
text).      
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